Not thinking about science and religion by Topham, J.R.
promoting access to White Rose research papers 
   
White Rose Research Online 
 
 
Universities of Leeds, Sheffield and York 
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
This is an author produced version of a paper published in Minerva 
 
 
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: 
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/3321/ 
 
 
 
Published paper 
Topham, J.R. (2002) Not thinking about science and religion, Minerva, Volume 
40 (2), 203 – 209. 
 
  
 
 
 
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk 
 
Essay Review 
 
NOT THINKING ABOUT SCIENCE AND RELIGION 
 
Willem B. Drees, Religion, Science and Naturalism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), xvi + 314 pp. 
 
It is often an illuminating, if sobering, experience to see one’s work through the eyes 
of another discipline. Theologian Willem Drees gives historians researching the 
interactions of science and religion just such an experience. The thrust of Drees’s 
project is to argue for the application of a form of ontological naturalism to religion 
(or, more specifically, to Christianity) and to consider what remains of religion when 
this has been done.  In developing this project, however, he devotes interesting 
chapters to modern discussions of science and religion, and to ‘histories of 
relationships between science and religion’.  His assessment raises questions that 
historians would do well to consider. 
 
Drees’s account follows the predominant theme in the recent historical 
literature on science and religion, given canonical form by John Brooke’s magisterial 
Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 
1991).  First, he points to the inadequacy of accounts which describe ‘the history of 
the interactions of science and religion ... stereotypically as a warfare between two 
contending powers’, observing that more sensitive studies reveal that historical 
confrontations were often ‘about the natures of science and of religion’ (p. 54).  
Second, he points to the inadequacy of histories that claim that Christianity was 
‘essential to the rise of modern science’, arguing that this, too, relies on an 
essentialist and context-independent view of both science and religion.  These claims 
are substantiated by surveys of modern scholarship on the ‘Galileo affair’, the ‘post-
Darwinian conflicts’, and on ‘Christianity as the matrix in which science arose’.  
Drawing upon the contextually sensitive histories written in recent decades, which 
highlight both the constantly shifting boundaries of ‘science’ and ‘religion’ and the 
social construction of scientific knowledge, Drees follows John Brooke in concluding 
that ‘The real lesson [of history] turns out to be the complexity’ (p. 89). 
 
So far, so good: these are important points, and it is pleasing to see them 
gain wider currency. What is striking about Drees’s account, however, is what it does 
not include. In his introductory chapter, Drees discusses at length different possible 
views of religion. In particular, he follows theologian George Lindbeck’s 
categorization of three views of religion, namely, a propositional–cognitivist view 
(which sees religion, and especially theology, as ‘an attempt to grasp the true, 
ultimate nature of reality’); an experiential–expressivist view (which ‘interprets 
doctrines as noninformative and nondiscursive symbols of inner feelings, attitudes, or 
existential orientations’); and a cultural–linguistic view (which ‘understands religions 
as traditions by which people live, which shape their lives, both individually and 
communally’) (p. 31). 
  
Yet, in discussing histories of science and religion, Drees’s account focuses 
almost exclusively upon this cognitive view, albeit within the wider frame of modern 
social historiography.  Reviewing work in this area he notes that ‘arguments about 
conflicts or affinities between Christian religion and science … are mostly based on a 
cognitive view of religion in line with the understanding of the natural sciences’ (p. 
88).  The major exception to this, in Drees’s account, is a form of history, developed 
by theological writers Michael J. Buckley and John Dillenberger, which Drees calls 
‘non-apologetical apologetics’. In these histories, the scientization of Christian 
apologetics, from the seventeenth century onwards, is seen as denaturing 
Christianity by undermining the significance of personal religious experience.  Drees 
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contrasts the experiential view of religion adopted by these historians with the 
cognitive view commonly taken in other accounts, although in Drees’s theological 
project, both are subject to naturalistic explanation. 
 
It is questionable to what extent Drees’s survey does justice to recent 
historical studies that emphasize the non-cognitive elements of religion. Certainly, his 
own view is heavily weighted in favour of the cognitive, and this has undoubtedly 
shaped his account. Yet, reading his introductory chapter, with its far more broadly 
based discussion of the nature of religion, it is striking how rarely the non-cognitive 
elements of religion have been discussed by historians of science. Having laboured 
hard to repudiate the master narratives of conflict and harmony, it is arguable that 
historians have taken the impress of such narratives in their continued emphasis on 
the cognitive aspects of religion. 
 
Of course, the fact that the various forms of the conflict thesis were 
themselves products of the histories of science and religion in the nineteenth century 
should alert us to the pivotal importance of the cognitive aspects of religion in these 
histories. Indeed, it is the argument of social anthropologist, Malcolm Ruel, that 
Christianity has been historically unique in the great importance it has given to belief, 
and that approaching other religions from within Christian or post-Christian cultures is 
fraught with the danger of importing a profoundly foreign concept.1 Clearly, this 
insight is of great importance to those concerned with the history of science in, for 
example, Islamic and Jewish contexts.  I would suggest, however, that the insight is 
equally relevant to those concerned with the history of science in Christian contexts.  
For, an appreciation of the historical and cultural specificity of the Christian emphasis 
on belief alerts the historian to the fact that this emphasis is not an essential element 
of religion, but rather a phenomenon requiring explanation.   
 
Once the historical contingency of the emphasis on belief in religion is 
acknowledged, it becomes increasingly apparent, as Malcolm Ruel has shown, that 
such an emphasis has a history. For historians of science, one of the most important 
periods in this history is the latter part of the nineteenth century, when those who 
sought to create a secular context for the pursuit of scientific knowledge by 
employing various forms of conflict thesis, did so to a considerable extent by 
restricting their view of religion to one of propositional belief, underpinned by 
ecclesiastical authority.  In moving beyond these narratives of conflict, historians 
have not only to acknowledge the contextual specificity of the views of religion which 
they embody, but also to develop a wider analytical framework that embodies a 
diversity of views of religion. 
 
So where might we begin?  An obvious counterpart to religious belief, and 
particularly to the cognitive–propositional content of belief, is religious practice.2  
Moreover, this categorization has the particular advantage that it resonates with 
recent historical interest in scientific practice.3  Given that historians have long since 
departed from the idea that science is quintessentially a theoretical entity, untouched 
by and independent of the experimental, observational, or representational practices 
of scientists, it should not be hard to make the case that religion is more than 
theology, and that the practice of religion is also of critical importance.  Even the 
different traditions in Christianity, heavily dependent upon belief as a central concept, 
are most obviously characterized by their more or less elaborate ritual observances 
                                            
1 Malcolm Ruel, ‘Christians as Believers’, in Belief, Ritual and the Securing of Life: Reflexive 
Essays on a Bantu Religion (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997), 36-59. 
2 On this, see James R. Moore, ‘Speaking of “Science and Religion” – Then and Now’, 
History of Science, 30 (1992), 311–323. 
3 See, for example, Jan Golinski, ‘The Theory of Practice and the Practice of Theory: 
Sociological Approaches in the History of Science’, Isis, 81 (1990), 492-505. 
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and by clearly defined sets of practical duties.  Nevertheless, little attention has 
focused on the practice of religion in historical narratives relating to science. 
 
Perhaps the religious practice to have received most attention from historians 
in regard to science is that of apologetics.  Yet even here the interest has been 
directed more to the cognitive content of apologetic accounts, than to the practices of 
apologetics themselves.  To read apologetic writings as if they were exercises in 
dogmatic or systematic theology is critically to miss the point.  Apologetic 
performances, whether verbal or written, must be read as rhetorical exercises with 
radically different purposes from theological exposition.  Of course, this applies not 
only to apologetic writings and utterances, but also to devotional and homiletic ones.  
As John Brooke and Geoffrey Cantor have recently shown, for instance, it is 
impoverishing simply to dismiss the argument from design as ‘wrong or trivial and 
easily undermined by the philosophically sophisticated’.  The object of the genre of 
natural theology was quite distinct from the elaboration of a systematic theology or 
the conversion of atheists; indeed, according to Brooke and Cantor, its object was 
primarily to ‘rescue waverers and bring them back into the Christian fold’.4 This was 
to be achieved, they show, by rhetoric, which was understood as appealing ‘to the 
imagination and the emotions as well as to the faculty of reason.’5 
 
Many of Brooke and Cantor’s examples date from early nineteenth-century 
Britain, where, with burgeoning literacy and an expanding book trade, devout 
Christians increasingly encountered science primarily through the medium of print.  
The new religious magazines of the period sought to show readers how to 
incorporate scientific reading into the practice of Christian piety. The primary concern 
of such magazines was to preserve or engender correct religious sentiments and 
sensibility in the context of scientific reading. Such findings represent a radical 
departure from most historical accounts we have of early nineteenth-century religious 
responses to science, which focus on theological debates about science conducted 
largely by theological specialists. By focusing upon religious practice, rather than 
upon the cognitive content of formal theologies, the historian is thus confronted both 
with a far larger cast of historical actors, and often with very different interests in 
regard to science.   
 
The focus upon religious practice is, of course, as relevant to those actively 
involved in the public world of science as to ordinary pew-sitters. In his biography of 
Michael Faraday, Geoffrey Cantor has demonstrated the importance of analysing 
how the religious practices, as well as the religious beliefs of scientists, influenced 
their scientific beliefs and practices. In particular, Cantor has argued that the life of 
rigorous discipline and strict morality of the small Protestant sect to which Faraday 
belonged was carried over to his practice as a scientist; that Faraday ‘transferred the 
Sandemanian social philosophy to science.’6  More generally in the last decade, 
scientific practitioners have increasingly been viewed not only as believers of 
religious doctrines, but also as practitioners of religion involved in public worship and 
personal devotion, in preaching and in evangelism, and in religious community. As 
John Brooke has shown, reading William Whewell’s manuscript sermons – that is, 
considering the ‘omniscient’ master of Trinity as ‘apologist and priest’ as well as 
theologian and scientist – provides a radically different perspective on both his 
religion and science.7 
                                            
4 John Brooke and Geoffrey Cantor, Reconstructing Nature: The Engagement of Science and 
Religion (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1998), 200. 
5 Ibid., 182. 
6 Geoffrey Cantor, Michael Faraday: Sandemanian and Scientist (London: Macmillan, 1991), 
295. 
7 John Hedley Brooke, ‘Indications of a Creator: Whewell as Apologist and Priest’, in 
Menachem Fisch and Simon Schaffer (eds.), William Whewell: A Composite Portrait (Oxford: 
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It is clear, then, that a focus upon religious practice brings new insights to 
bear on the history of science. Moreover, such a focus opens up many new sources 
to historical scrutiny. It now becomes relevant, for example, to consider hymnody and 
liturgy in relation to science. Apologetic, homiletic, or devotional texts are no longer 
merely to be dismissed as bad theology. Instead, they gain their own significance in 
relation to the practices of apologetics, preaching, or piety, in which the stirring of the 
passions was often more important than the convincing of the intellect. The social 
practices of churches, mosques, synagogues, and other religious bodies also 
become relevant, with the nature of community and ecclesiastical authority often 
belying explicit theologies. 
   
However, the significance of practice goes even deeper. In Drees’ survey of 
histories of science and religion, the only extended study (other than those he 
describes as ‘non-apologetical apologetics’) which is not primarily concerned with the 
cognitive content of religion, is Robert K. Merton’s ‘Science, Technology and Society 
in Seventeenth-Century England’ (Osiris 4 (1938): 360–632). Of course, the ‘Merton 
thesis’ has been debated at great length. What is relevant is the way in which its 
sociological framework serves to put religious practice into a wider context.  As 
Steven Shapin has shown, Merton drew eclectically on the sociological theories of 
Vilfredo Pareto in positing non-rational and unconscious ‘sentiments’ as being the 
‘wellsprings of the social actions involved in sanctioning and pursuing science in 
seventeenth-century England.’8  According to Merton, both ideologies and actions 
are ‘the product of common sentiments and values which motivate conduct’.9   
 
A related view of the relationship between non-rational and unconscious 
values and social action is found in the work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, in 
whose work historians of science have taken increasing interest.10 Seeking, like 
Merton, a middle way between idealist and materialist accounts of culture, Bourdieu 
has constructed a theory in which practices result from dispositions embodied during 
socialization, especially childhood socialization (the habitus).11 Given the chequered 
history of the ‘Merton thesis’, there is perhaps little encouragement to move beyond 
religious practices to consider the ‘sentiments’ and ‘dispositions’ which they embody.  
However, such an approach promises much to the historian of science interested to 
move beyond the merely cognitive view of religion. 
 
I began by observing that historians should reflect on the disparity between 
Drees’s account of the complexity of religion as a social, cultural and psychological 
phenomenon, and his account of the largely cognitive histories of science and 
religion.  While the recent historiographical emphasis on scientific practice has gone 
some way to alerting historians to the importance of religious practice, there remains 
much ground to cover in this area.  In particular, more historical attention should be 
paid to the underlying dispositions characteristic of different religious traditions, 
which give religious practitioners a ‘feel for the game’ – a non-rational, unconscious 
and practical sense of how to live the religious life. 
 
In his concluding chapter, having identified many aspects of religion as being 
inconsistent with ontological naturalism, Drees is left accepting a religion that is ‘a 
particular human articulation of a way of life, an articulation which is qualified and 
                                                                                                                             
Clarendon Press, 1991), 149–173. 
8 Steven Shapin, ‘Understanding the Merton Thesis’, Isis, 79 (1988), 594–605, on 601. 
9 Quoted in ibid., 603. 
10 See, for example, Anne Secord, ‘Science in the Pub: Artisan Botanists in Early Nineteenth-
century Lancashire’, History of Science, 32 (1994), 269–315. 
11 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977), and Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990). 
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relativized by a sense of transcendence which may be nourished by reflections on 
limit-questions’ (p. 237).  After so much consideration of Christian belief, it is 
particularly apposite that Drees’s last word on religion should be aimed so pointedly 
towards practice. 
Jonathan R. Topham 
 
